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,I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ROY J. TIPPETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15512 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is the reply brief of the appellant in his appeal 
from a conviction of Robbery, a Felony of the Second Degree, in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered 
against him and a new trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT NEVER WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO CONFLICT-FREE, SEPARATE COUNSEL. 
Appellant submits that respondent misconstrues the law on 
waiver of a constitutional right. It is well settled that an accused 
may waive his right to protections guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Thus, although a conflict of interest may indeed violate an accused's 
right to effective assistance of counsel, that right may be waived. 
However, it bears repeating that the trial court bears a significant 
responsibility for ensuring that fundamental rights are relinquished 
voluntarily and intelligently and only after an accused has an 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of 
1 
such a waiver. Thus, in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
71 (1942), the Supreme Court stated that "we indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of a fundamental right." 
In the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that the 
appellant was not present when the decision was made that Esplin 
would represent both the appellant and his co-defendant (R. 1-4), the 
State concludes in its brief that this Court should infer that he 
did nonetheless waive his right to conflict-free, separate counsel. 
1. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
- 2 -
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for example, in Point I of respondent's brief it is stated, "Clearly 
defendant Lopez was informed of his right to continue the trial 
(T. 1-4) and it can be inferred that Esplin, appellant's original 
sole counsel, fully explained the situation to appellant before the 
pre-trial conference." (Respondent's brief at 14-15; Emphasis supplied). 
This same reasoning is echoed throughout respondent's brief. Another 
striking example is found in Point IV of respondent's brief, where 
respondent states, "After carefully considering the matter, Lopez, 
Esplin, the trial judge, and appellant -- through the proxy represen-
tation of Esplin acting in his behalf -- all agreed that there would 
be no conflict problem." (Respondent's brief at 28; Emphasis supplied). 
In Point III respondent also cites authority for the proposition that 
the appellant's silence can be construed as a waiver. Coates v. 
Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (1942). 
Appellant submits that the respondent's proxy and silence 
theories of waiver are dramatically opposed to the decisional law 
which has evolved in the area of the waiver of a constitutional right. 
In Carnley v. Cochran, 396 U.S. 506 (1962), the United States Supreme 
Court laid to rest the notion that waiver of a fundamental right 
could be inferred from a silent record. The Cornley court held that: 
Presuming waiver of the right to counsel from a 
silent record is impermissible. The record must 
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence 
which show, that an accused was offered counsel 
but intelligently and understandingly rejected 
the offer. Anything less is not waiver. 396 
U.S. at 516. (Emphasis Supplied) 
Similarly, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), where the 
- 3 -
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Court held that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to waive 
counsel altogether, the Court insisted that before an accused 
could forego the guiding hand of counsel, he must fully understand 
the benefits he is relinquishing: 
Although a defendant need not himself have the 
skill and experience of a lawyer in order compe-
tently and intelligently to choose self-represen-
tation, he should be made aware of the dangers of 
self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that "he knows what he is doin and his 
choice is made with eyes open. citations omitted] 
422 U.S. at 835. (Emphasis Supplied) 
In the instant matter, the record is barren of any indication that 
the appellant was admonished by either the trial court or his trial 
counsel about the possible ramifications of multiple representation. 
At least one court has found a valid waiver where an 
attorney represented to the court that he had discussed the possibilitj 
of a conflict of interest with the defendant and the defendant 
agreed that no conflict was present. In United States v. Armone, 
363 F.2d 385, 406 (2nd Circuit 1966), the defendant challenged his 
conviction on the basis that a conflict of interest prevented him 
from receiving a fair trial. There the possibility of a conflict 
was probed at a pre-trial hearing. In rejecting the defendant's 
conflict claim, the Second Circuit pointed to the fact that the 
record revealed that the defendant was present when his attorney 
represented to the trial court that he had fully discussed the matter 
with the defendant and that he consented to the dual representatioo. 
Comparing Armone to the case at bar, it is readily apparent that 
none of the circumstances of the defendant's informed consent in 
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~are present in the instant matter. Mr. Esplin never made 
any such representations to the trial court and the appellant was 
never present when the conflict issue was specifically addressed. 
For these reasons, respondent's reliance on United States v. Woods, 
544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976) and United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 
1 (1st Cir. 1972), is misplaced. In both of those cases, reference 
is made to on-the-record discussion with the defendants to insure 
that they were aware of the risks of multiple representation. It 
bears repeating that appellant Tippetts was never present during any 
such inquiry. 
In United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir., 1975), 
the Fifth Circuit construed Faretta v. California, supra, to mean 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to waive the effective 
assistance of counsel and choose a lawyer serving conflicting interests. 
In reaching this result, however, the Fifth Circuit analogized an 
accused's waiver of his attorney's possible conflict of interest to the 
procedural requirements associated with accepting a guilty plea: 
. the . . . court should address each defendant 
personally and forthrightly advise him of the 
potential dangers of representation by counsel with 
a conflict of interest. The defendant must be at 
liberty to question the . . . court as to the 
nature and consequences of his legal representation. 
Most significantly, the court should seek to elicit 
a narrative response from each defendant that he has 
been advised of his right to effective representation, 
that he understands the details of his attorney's 
possible conflict of interest and the potential perils 
of such a conflict, that he has discussed the matter 
with his attorney or if he wishes with outside counsel, 
and that he voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment 
protections. . .. It is, of course, vital that the 
- 5 -
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waiver be established by 'clear, unequivocal, 
and unambiguous language. ' . Mere assent 
in response to a series of questions from the 
bench may in some circumstances constitute 
an adequate waiver, but the court should none-
theless endeavor to have each defendant personally 
articulate in detail his intent to forego this 
significant constitutional protection. Recordation 
of the waiver colloquy between defendant and judge 
will also serve the government's interest by 
assisting in shielding any potential conviction 
from collateral attack, either on Sixth Amendment 
grounds or on a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
'fundamental fairness' basis. 517 F.2d at 276. 
Courts are beginning to increasingly recognize the intrica· 
cies of obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of a complicated 
right, such as the right to conflict-free counsel, by a lay person whc 
lacks a lawyer's sophistication. Thus, in the article cited by 
respondent, "Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Con-
flicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the 
Defense Attorney", the commentator states: 
A generalized admonition by the trial court that 
counsel's duties to one client may conflict with 
duties to another is hardly sufficient to supply 
this knowledge, nor is the significance of poten-
tial conflicts likely to be understood. 62 Minn. 
L. Rev. 119, 140-141. 
Cognizant that some defendants may not be intelligently 
capable of fully understanding the significance of conflicts, some 
courts have declined to find a waiver despite explicit or implicit 
consent to multiple representation. In United States v. Bernstein, 
533 F. 2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), the Court found no waiver had been given 
despite the defendant's consent to multiple representation. And in 
United States v. Gains, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976), the Court 
- 6 -
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refused to find a waiver where the defendant had not been specifically 
warned about the risks lurking in multiple representation. The 
~ court stated: 
When the possiblity of a conflict appears during 
trial, the court must investigate the relevant 
facts, advise the defendant, and determine 
whether continued representation, absent wavier, 
would violate the sixth amendment. 529 F.2d 
at 1043. (Emphasis Supplied) 
In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Supreme Court 
in Glasser v. United States, supra, eschewed the Government's argu-
ment that Glasser had waived his Sixth Amendment rights. In Glasser 
the defendant's attorney, Stewart, was appointed to represent the 
co-defendant, Kretske. Glasser, an experienced trial lawyer who had 
served for more than four years as a U. S. attorney prosecuting 
criminal cases, objected and stated he preferred the individual 
loyalty of his own attorney. However, after an on-the-record dis-
cussion of the matter with all parties present, the Court appointed 
Stewart to assume the defense of Kretske. Glasser did not object 
at that time. 
In the instant case, appellant is not a veteran trial 
lawyer. He obviously lacked the knowledge of the need to preserve 
objections for appellate review. And unlike Glasser v. United States, 
supra, the appellant was not present during a lengthy discussion 
of the conflict problem. 
Furthermore, respondent has misstated the holding of 
Glasser v. United States, supra, when he states on page 6 of the 
- 7 -
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brief: 
The Supreme Court ruled that the conflict must 
be "brought home to the court" by the party 
who believes he is being denied effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Respondent interprets Glasser as thrusting an affirmative duty on 
the defendant to convince the trial court that a conflict exists. 
This is not the holding of Glasser; and the quoted language is 
taken out of context. The sentence, in its entirety, is 
reprinted below, and appellant asserts that respondent's purported 
holding cannot reasonably be inferred from the Court's language: 
Of equal importance with the duty of the 
court to see that an accused has the assistance 
of counsel is its duty to refrain from 
embarrassing counsel in the defense of an 
accused by insisting, or indeed, even 
suggesting, that counsel undertake to con-
currently represent interests which might 
diverge from those of his first client, 
when the possibility of that divergence is 
brought home to the court. 315 U.S. at 76. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CONCEDES THAT HE DID NOT PERSONALLY 
MAKE A TIMELY OBJECTION TO BEING REPRESENTED 
BY AN ATTORNEY WITH DUAL LOYALTIES. 
In response to Point III in respondent's brief, appellant 
readily concedes that "he comes before the appellant court only now 
waiving the banner of conflict of interest at this late date. No 
mention was made of such an objection at trial." (Respondent's 
brief at 23). Respondent fails to understand that the absence of 
a timely objection to the dual representation is entirely consistent 
- 8 -
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with appellant's contention that the conflict hampered his attorney 
and precluded him from receiving effective assistance of counsel. 
Apparently respondent feels that despite the fact that the appellant 
was never warned by either the trial court or his attorney of the 
risks inherent in dual representation, he nonetheless should have 
made a pro se objection to preserve the issue for appeal. 
This argument is certainly paradoxical. On the one hand, 
we have case law which vigorously guards the accused's precious right 
to counsel. After decades of discussion, the Supreme Court in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), put to rest the notion that 
an accused can have a fair trial without a lawyer's assistance. 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court reaffirmed Justice Sutherland's 
now famous words from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932): 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right 
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of the law. If charged with a 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. 
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial 
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incom-
petent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the 
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare 
his defense, even though he has a perfect one. 
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every 
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence. If that be true of men 
of intelligence how much more true is it of those 
of feeble intellect. Id at 58. 
But on the other hand, respondent argues that the appellant should 
- 9 -
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simultaneously be held responsible for evaluating the attorney's 
tactics. Thus, the respondent submits that the appellant must estab 
lish by his own efforts the very things for whichthe Supreme Court 
recognized he needed the assistance of counsel in the first place 
and which he did not receive. Appellant submits that this reasoning 
is constitutionally infirm. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and the arguments previously 
asserted in appellant's original brief, it is requested that the 
judgment of the trial court be reversed and the appellant granted a 
new trial. 
DATED this day of August, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 10 -
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